

**M PROPS (PTY) LTD**

**Risk Assessment of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop**

**Report No. 334822/2**

**Revision 2013**



## **M PROPS (PTY) LTD**

### **Risk Assessment of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop**

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**Report No. 334822/2**

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## Risk Assessment of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop

### 1 Introduction

This risk assessment report has been compiled on request by M Props and complies with requirements of the Mine Health and Safety Act, 29 of 1996, with specific reference to Chapter 2, Section 21.

The Heavy Duty Camlok Prop is designed to perform in general mining conditions where a high load bearing capacity is required, excluding seismic and high closure conditions.

The objective of this risk assessment is to logically describe the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop in a systematic method in order to identify the hazards and their associated probability of occurrence so that the level of risk can be assigned to the hazards. By adopting this approach, it is hoped that reading of the document would not be onerous on the reader and the major hazards and their associated risks be clearly highlighted in the text with the full risk assessment as backup in the appendices. For this purpose the fault-event tree risk assessment method was selected as the most suitable for this purpose. A brief description of the method can be found in Appendix A.

### 2 Risk Assessment Team

A team approach was adopted to ensure that the risk assessment covered as many aspects as possible through two workshops by combining the team's experience and expertise of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop. The risk assessment team members are listed in Table 1.



**Partners** MJ Braune, JM Brown, AC Burger-Pintér, IS Cameron-Clarke, JAC Cowan, M Harley, T Hart, PR Labrum, RRW McNeill, HAC Meintjes, BJ Middleton, MJ Morris, SG Muller, GP Murray, PN Rosewarne, PE Schmidt, PJ Shepherd, AA Smithen, OKH Steffen, RJ Stuart, AH Swart, PJ Terbrugge, KM Uderstadt, D van Bladeren, DJ Venter, HG Waldeck, A Wood  
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**Table 1: Risk Assessment Team Members**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Designation</b>	<b>Experience</b>
Mr Ed Groves	Director M Props	29 Years Research and Development & Sales
Mr Colin May	Sales Manager M Props	23 Years Research and Development & Sales
Mr Peter Flood	Area Sales Manager M Props	13 Years Mining 8 Years Sales
Mr John von Ruben	Technical Representative Training M Props	21 Years Mining 4 Years Training
Mr Mike Strong	Technical Representative Training M Props	4 Years Training
Mr Louie Human	Senior Consultant SRK Consulting	11 Years Mining 3 years Consulting

### 3 Quality Assurance


The consistency of the performance of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop supplied to the mine is maintained through a quality assurance program implemented during manufacture by M Props and the high quality material supplied to the manufacturer by their accredited suppliers.

### 4 Risk Assessment Process

Two workshops were held where the risk assessment team identified thirteen stages during the life cycle of a typical Heavy Duty Camlok Prop. The top risk for each stage was the threat of injury to mining personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop occurring. A probability of occurrence for each root cause was assigned by the risk assessment team on a judgemental basis. A probability of occurrence for each top fault was calculated using the fault tree method. This probability of occurrence was used as the base to determine the probability of mining personnel being injured or fatally injured whilst using the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop. Finally a risk profile was compiled for the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop benchmarked against the life time probability of being fatally injured in a public place and public transport (Cole, 1993).

#### 4.1 Heavy Duty Camlok Prop Life Cycle

The life cycle of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop starts when an order is received from a mine by M Props for delivery and ends when the prop is declared not fit for purpose due to excessive 'wear and tear' and/or corrosion of the prop and removed from the work place (Figure 1).



**Figure 1: Life Cycle of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop**

The hazards associated with each stage of the life cycle of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop were discussed and documented by the team during the workshops. Conclusions from these discussions are described for each stage of the life cycle, where the main risks associated with the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop are highlighted. The full risk assessment can be found in Appendix B.

*4.1.1 Procurement Procedure*

The hazards with the highest probability of occurrence associated with procurement of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop by the mine purchasing department are identified to be the following:

- **Incorrect type** of Camlok Prop ordered for the mine loading conditions is considered “**Low**” ~  $(1.10 \times 10^{-04})$ ;
- **Incorrect length** of Camlok Prop ordered for the current panel stopping width or excavation size with regards to development ends or large excavations is considered “**Low**” ~  $(1.00 \times 10^{-04})$ ;

The overall probability of occurrence of a threat of injury to mining personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop due to poor procurement procedures is considered “**Low**” ~  $(3.31 \times 10^{-04})$ .

However, the mine should ensure that the type of Camlok Prop ordered is appropriate for the general loading conditions experienced on the mine, through a detailed rock engineering design and underground assessment.

#### 4.1.2 *Receiving by Mine*

The hazards associated with this cycle of the prop's life were seen as mainly being the off-loading of the prop at the stores from the delivery vehicle. The hazards identified are related to:

- **Lack of off-loading equipment** is considered "**Low**" ~  $(5.00 \times 10^{-04})$  with the likelihood of hand and foot injuries to mine personnel due to falling or the dropping of props while off-loading
- The probability of injuries occurring while **handling long props** is also considered to be "**Low**" ~  $(1.00 \times 10^{-04})$ .
- **Late time of delivery** increases the probability of occurrence of a failure where labour may have already left for the day, leaving insufficient personnel to assist with the off-loading of the delivery vehicle. The probability of occurrence is considered "**Low**" ~  $(1.01 \times 10^{-04})$

The overall probability of injuries occurring to mining personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop due to poor receiving practice by the mine is considered "**Low**" ~  $(7.07 \times 10^{-04})$ .

However, the mine should ensure that sufficient labour and off-loading equipment is available in the receiving yard to safely off-load and transport the props to the storage yard. The availability of Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) and training in correct handling of props will reduce the risk of injury to mine personnel.

#### 4.1.3 *Surface Storage*

The team identified the main hazard associated with storage of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop at the mine's storage facility as **weathering of props**, if stored out in the open. Weathering of props can cause the following:

- **Sun damage to props** can lead to peeling off of the identification label which contains information on the type of prop. Without this label the user may be unable to identify the correct type of prop to be used. The probability of occurrence is considered "**Extremely Low**" ~  $(1.00 \times 10^{-06})$

- **Sun damage to Release Slings** can lead to fading of the colour coded slings, making it difficult for the user to identify the correct length of sling is considered “**Low**” ~  $(1.00 \times 10^{-04})$ .
- **Storage in mud / water** may lead to premature corrosion of the prop is considered “**Extremely Low**” ~  $(2.00 \times 10^{-06})$ .

The overall probability of injuries occurring to mining personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop due to poor surface storage by the mine is considered “**Low**” ~  $(2.08 \times 10^{-04})$ .

However, the mine should ensure that the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop and accessories are stored under cover and not exposed to sun and rain. A procedure should be implemented which ensures correct stock rotation, with Last In, Last Out (LIFO) principle being applied.

#### 4.1.4 *Dispatching to the Shaft*

The team agreed that the hazards associated with dispatching of the props to the shaft by the mine stores are similar to those identified during receiving by the mine. Although time of delivery is not an issue as the stores operate during set times and the hazards associated with rushing of loading may not exist.

The overall probability of injuries occurring to mining personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop due to poor dispatching procedures by the mine is considered “**Low**” ~  $(7.06 \times 10^{-04})$ .

#### 4.1.5 *Shaft Transport*

This stage of the prop’s life cycle includes the transportation of the props in vertical or inclined shafts. The hazards identified by the team are:

- **Poor packing and stacking of props in material cars** could lead to prop handling injuries while unpacking was highlighted as being “**Medium**” with the probability of occurrence of  $(2.05 \times 10^{-03})$ .
- **Poor slinging practice of long props** also poses the hazard of material falling down the shaft or catching on shaft steel work while in transit. Although the probability of occurrence is considered “**Extremely Low**” ~  $(2.00 \times 10^{-06})$ , the consequences could be disastrous.
- **Lack of shaft availability** was also highlighted as a potential problem as this would delay the arrival of the props at the designated workplace and lack of support units in the workplace increases the risk of injury to mine



personnel or lost production. The probability of occurrence is considered **“Very Low”** ~  $(2.00 \times 10^{-05})$ .

The overall probability of injuries occurring to mining personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop due to poor shaft transport procedures by the mine is considered **“Medium”** ~  $(2.07 \times 10^{-03})$ .

The mine should ensure that appropriate procedures are in place regarding the packing and transportation of props, with emphasis on long props and slinging if required.

#### 4.1.6 *Horizontal Transport*

This section of the risk assessment workshop focused on the hazards associated with the transportation of props in material cars in mine haulages to the work place. The team identified the two main hazards as being:

- **Poor packing of material cars** which may lead to props falling off material cars or protruding from the material car and able to strike mine personnel while being transported is considered to be **“Medium”** ~  $(2.05 \times 10^{-03})$ .
- **Poor handling of long props** which may lead to protruding or falling of loose props in the material car is considered to be **“Medium”** ~  $(2.0 \times 10^{-03})$ .

The overall probability of injuries occurring to mining personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop due to poor horizontal transport procedures by the mine is considered **“Medium”** ~  $(4.24 \times 10^{-03})$ .

The mine should ensure that correctly sized material cars are available and correct packing and transport procedures are in place to ensure that this task is performed safely.

#### 4.1.7 *Transport in the Workplace*

The team agreed that this was one of the important cycles of the prop’s life, as the props are now transported manually by the mine personnel or attached to mono winch ropes for transportation into the stope area. The main hazards identified were:

- Injury while **transporting the props to the stope** is identified as having a **“Medium”** ~  $(8.14 \times 10^{-03})$  probability of occurrence with the following two categories:

- Injury to mine personnel whilst the prop is being **transported by the mono winch system** is considered to be “**Medium**” ~  $(1.14 \times 10^{-03})$ ;
  - Injury to mine personnel whilst **manually transporting** the prop to the stope is considered to be “**Medium**” ~  $(7.01 \times 10^{-03})$ .
- Poor **underground storage** in the timber bay **may** result in injury due to tripping and falling or falling props due to poor stacking is considered to be “**Medium**” ~  $(4.40 \times 10^{-03})$ .
  - When transporting props in tunnel development, **inclined development** is identified as having a slightly higher probability of occurrence  $(4.90 \times 10^{-03})$  when compared to that of horizontal development  $(2.61 \times 10^{-03})$ . This is due to the higher probability of injury caused by slipping and falling due to **poor footwall conditions** in inclined development areas.

The overall probability of injuries occurring to mining personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop due to poor transportation to the workplace is considered “**High**” ~  $(1.73 \times 10^{-02})$ .

The mine should ensure that adequate procedures are in place for transportation of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop to the stope via a mono winch system. If the props are to be manually transported to the workplace, the mine is to ensure that the distance to travel is not excessively far and adequately ventilated and there is sufficient clearance in which to travel.

#### 4.1.8 Installation

The installation of the prop in the workplace has the highest probability of occurrence of all the stages of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop life cycle. This stage was sub-divided into the following hazards:

- **Poor making safe** which can result in a fall of ground accident which may also be triggered by disturbing the hangingwall whilst installing the prop is considered “**High**” ~  $(1.10 \times 10^{-02})$ ;
- **Poor footwall conditions** may cause the user to slip and fall while installing the prop as well as providing an unstable footing for the installed

prop, which will reduce the prop's performance capabilities is considered **“High”** ~  $(1.99 \times 10^{-02})$ ;

- **Poor permanent support installation** as a result of the permanent support not being installed to mine standard or already having worked beyond its capabilities, the installation of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop becomes more hazardous and is considered **“High”** ~  $(1.00 \times 10^{-02})$ ;
- **Failure to examine prop condition** may result in unsafe work conditions by increasing the probability of fall of ground occurrences as the prop will not perform to the specified level or may not be installed due to being completely inoperable. The probability of occurrence is considered **“High”** ~  $(1.99 \times 10^{-02})$ ;
- **Poor positioning of the prop** will result in insufficient support resistance being applied to the hangingwall or incorrect prop orientation which will increase the risk of removing the prop safely is considered **“Very High”** ~  $(1.79 \times 10^{-01})$ ;
- **Failure to extend the inner tube and locate setting pin correctly** will result in poor performance of the prop due to an insufficient preload and the prop being easily dislodged is considered **“High”** ~  $(5.11 \times 10^{-02})$ ;
- **Failure to pre-tension the loading mechanism correctly** will result in an insufficient preload on the props and being easily dislodged is considered **“High”** ~  $(2.05 \times 10^{-02})$ .

The overall probability of injuries occurring to mining personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop during installation in the workplace is considered **“Very High”** ~  $(2.60 \times 10^{-01})$ .

The mine should ensure that all mine personnel required to use the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop are trained correctly according to the lesson plan provided by M Props.

#### 4.1.9 *Installed Prop*

This stage of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop covers the period when the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop is installed and acting as temporary support in the workplace. The major hazards with the highest probability of occurrence are identified as:

- **Falls of ground** may occur due to poor ground conditions or when the prop is dislodged as a result of block rotation of loose hangingwall, structural failure of the prop due to excessive loading or lateral loading caused by a

fall of ground. The probability of occurrences for this is considered “**High**” ~ (4.42 x 10<sup>-02</sup>).

- **Inappropriate support design** which may result in prop failure due to inappropriate prop type or insufficient load bearing capacity of the prop is considered “**High**” ~ (2.98 x 10<sup>-02</sup>). This hazard also includes lateral loading due to the installation of safety nets which may result in props being dislodged during a fall of ground.
- **Illegal removal** of an installed prop which normally occurs when the prop is deemed to be in the way, normally by the drill operator, is considered “**High**” ~ (2.85 x 10<sup>-02</sup>). This illegal removal of a prop **increases the probability of falls of ground** due to the **increased support span**. The human factor further increases the probability of failure, as the prop under these circumstances may not normally be removed in the appropriate safe manner as prescribed in the lesson plan.
- **Unapproved use of a prop other than for support purposes** may lead to falls of ground due to the prop being dislodged. Example: Rigging on an installed prop for cleaning purposes. The probability of occurrence is considered to be “**High**” ~ (1.00 x 10<sup>-02</sup>).

The overall probability of injuries occurring to mining personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop during the shift is considered to be “**Very High**” ~ (1.08 x 10<sup>-01</sup>).

The mine should ensure that all stope and development mine personnel are trained in the correct use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop. The drill operators are to be made aware of the hazards involved with the illegal removal of the prop and the procedure to be followed if the prop needs to be removed. The mine is to ensure appropriate support design is in place and that the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop is used for the purpose that it is intended. If safety nets are to be implemented by the mine as a safety initiative, the mine must ensure that the lateral load capacity of the prop can comply with the maximum load bearing capacity of the safety net.

#### 4.1.10 Prop Removal

The risk assessment process showed prop removal to be ranked third after prop installation and the installed prop during the shift. The major hazards identified during this cycle are:

- **Falls of ground** which may occur during the release of the Camlok Prop, where the probability of injury to mine personnel is significantly increased if the prop is **not released remotely** or the **incorrect release sling length**

is used. The probability of occurrence is considered “**Very High**” ~  $(1.35 \times 10^{-01})$

- **Failure of the prop to release** remotely due to **incorrect installation** procedure or **excessive closure** of the excavation or a “**dead weight**” which has caused the prop to “freeze” is considered “**High**” ~  $(3.16 \times 10^{-02})$ .
- **Releasing of the prop from a down dip position** increases the probability of occurrence of mine personnel being injured by a **fall of ground** or by being **struck by the prop**. The prop may also wedge due to the **pin extractor** not being used. The probability of occurrence is considered to be “**Medium**” ~  $(2.04 \times 10^{-03})$

The overall probability of injuries occurring to mining personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop while removing the prop after the shift is considered “**High**” ~  $(5.46 \times 10^{-02})$ .

The mine should ensure that all mine personnel required to use the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop are trained correctly according to the lesson plan provided by M Props.

#### 4.1.11 *Underground Storage*

The main hazard associated with underground storage of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop is incorrect storage conditions leading to damage which may cause premature failure of the prop and its accessories. The potential types of damage which can lead to poor prop performance are:

- The probability of **blast damage** to the prop if stored in close proximity to the face area is considered to be “**Medium**” ~  $(1.00 \times 10^{-03})$ ;
- The probability of **prop corrosion** when stored in wet muddy conditions, which may lead to premature corrosion of the prop is considered to be “**Medium**” ~  $(2.00 \times 10^{-03})$ .
- **Poor storage practice** may lead to injury to mine personnel through tripping and falling or falling props if the props are stored haphazardly. The probability of occurrence is considered to be “**Medium**” ~  $(1.20 \times 10^{-03})$ ;
- **Scraper damage to the prop** may occur if the prop is stored in the path of the scraper or in contact with scraper ropes. The probability of occurrence is considered to be “**Medium**” ~  $(1.00 \times 10^{-03})$ ;

- **Release sling failure** due to poor storage may lead to props being released without the use of a remote release sling, increasing the probability of a fall of ground injury. The probability of occurrence of sling failure due to damage is considered as **“Medium”** ~  $(1.00 \times 10^{-03})$ .

The overall probability of injuries occurring to mining personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop due to poor underground storage is considered **“Medium”** ~  $(8.17 \times 10^{-03})$ .

The mine should ensure that correct underground storage procedures are in place.

#### 4.1.12 Daily Underground Prop Assessment

This is an important aspect of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop’s life cycle, as the performance of the prop depends on its condition and level of corrosion. The assessment should be done on a daily basis before prop installation to guard against the following:

- **Poor assessment of the physical condition of the prop and corrosion washer indicator** is considered **“High”** ~  $(1.49 \times 10^{-02})$ .
- **Poor assessment of the physical condition of the release sling** is considered to have a **“Medium”** ~  $(5.99 \times 10^{-03})$  probability of occurrence.
- **Poor assessment of the physical condition of the inner tube lifter** when required is considered to have a **“Medium”** ~  $(4.99 \times 10^{-03})$  probability of occurrence.

The overall probability of injuries occurring to mining personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop due to poor prop performance as a result of poor daily underground prop assessment is considered to be **“High”** ~  $(2.57 \times 10^{-02})$ .

The mine is to ensure that a checklist is included in the daily assessment of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop. Section 12 of the risk assessment in Appendix B lists the critical checks for the prop and should be incorporated into the daily check list.


#### 4.1.13 Removal of ‘not fit for purpose’ Props

This is the final stage of the prop’s life cycle, when the daily prop assessment indicates that the prop is no longer fit for purpose. The prop should be removed from the workplace and transported to surface to be discarded. **Refurbishment of ‘not fit for purpose’ Heavy Duty Camlok Props by the mine or a contractor is not encouraged and M Props accepts no responsibility whatsoever for poor performance or failure of refurbished Camlok Props.**

## 4.2 Risk Profile

The probability of occurrence of the top fault, the threat to mine personnel while using the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop is calculated for each identified stage of the life cycle. From this the probability of a mine employee being injured or fatally injured can be calculated taking into account their exposure time and the potential severity of the hazard (Figure 2).

From this risk profile, it is clear that the risk of injury to mine personnel increases as the prop progresses through its life cycle towards the workplace and decreases after the prop has been removed from the workplace and stored for the next shift.



**Figure 2: Risk profile of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop**

Figure 2 shows a significant increase in the risk profile as the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop enters the workplace. The indicated benchmarks are the acceptable lifetime probability of total loss in a public place and while using public transport (Cole, 1993). The probability of a fatal injury to mine personnel while using the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop remains within acceptable limits, except for the installation, during the shift and removal of the prop. However, a mine employee trained in the correct use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop should be aware of the hazards and risks associated with his/her daily tasks underground, making them more vigilant thus reducing the risk to themselves when compared to a general member of the public with a low awareness and little ability to reduce the risk of being fatally injured in a public place or on public transport.

## 5 Conclusions

The threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop was assessed during this study. During the assessment, the typical life cycle of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop is described and documented in thirteen definable stages.

The probabilities of injuries occurring during each stage of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop's life cycle are determined, providing an overall probability of occurrence for the top risk, threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop.

A risk profile is compiled for the life cycle, where the threat of injury to mine personnel is determined by calculating the probability of injuries or fatal injuries occurring to mine personnel, taking into account the exposure of mine personnel to the hazards and the severity of the hazard. These probabilities are benchmarked against acceptable lifetime probabilities of being fatally injured in a public place or on public transport (Cole, 1993).

The risk profile for the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop shows that the risk value for all the identified stages of the life cycle are within acceptable limits, except for the stages involving the installation of the prop i.e. the installation of the prop during the shift and removal of the prop after the shift..

The mine should ensure that strategies are in place to reduce or eliminate the risks associated with the identified hazards of the use of the Heavy Duty Camlok Prop.



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## **Appendix A**

### **General Description of the Risks Assessment Method**

**GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE FAULT-EVENT TREE  
ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE**

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## GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Event, consequence	Potentially damaging consequences. It denotes the effects of the causative hazards, for example, injury to people or damage to machines and equipment.
Event tree analysis	An analysis that describes the possible range and sequence of the outcomes which may arise from an initiating event or top fault. The probability of occurrence of events is determined by considering the probability of occurrence of the top fault together with the relative weighting for the associated potentially adverse events.
Exposure	How often and for how long employees are exposed to a hazard.
Fatality accident rate (FAR)	The risk of death per 100 million hours of exposure to a dangerous activity. This is approximately the same as the probable number of fatalities from 1000 people involved in the activity for the whole of their working lives, each about 100 000 hours (50 years x 250 days/year x 8 hours/day).
Fault	Is a more general term than failure and can include the proper operation of an item at an inopportune time as well as the failure of an item to operate properly.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)	Is a technique, either qualitative or quantitative, by which sets of circumstances, which would need to co-exist, and can contribute to a specified undesired event (called the top event) are deductively identified, organised in a logical manner, and represented pictorially.
Gates	Show the relationships of faults needed for the occurrence of a higher fault. The higher fault is the output of the gate and the lower faults are the inputs to the gate. OR gates are used to show that the output fault occurs only if one or more of the input faults occur. AND gates are used to show that the output fault occurs only if all the input faults occur.

Harm	Injury or loss
Hazard, cause, fault, threat	Something that has the potential to cause harm e.g. fall of ground from the hangingwall.
Lifetime probability of occurrence	The probable unit number of times to which any person would be exposed to a detrimental event during his/her whole life. It is directly related to the fatality accident rate, FAR. Expressed as a percentage, the lifetime probability of occurrence of an event is therefore equal to $FAR \times 100/1000 = 0,1 \times FAR$ .
Primary faults	The primary categories in which the hazards to safety and health are considered e.g. threat of fall of ground due to bord collapse or threat of fall of ground due to pillar failure.
Probability of occurrence	The likelihood of a specific outcome, measured by the ratio of specific outcomes to the total number of possible outcomes. It is expressed as a number between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating an impossible outcome and 1 indicating an outcome is certain.
Risk	Is the product of the probability of occurrence of a hazard and the consequence of the hazard (severity of the damage of an event).
Risk analysis	A systematic use of available information to determine how often specific events may occur and the magnitude of their likely consequences (often interchangeably used for 'risk assessment').
Risk assessment	The decision making process whereby a level of risk is compared against criteria and risks are prioritised for action.
Risk management	The systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of identifying, analysing, assessing, treating and monitoring risk.

### Secondary faults

The component hazards that can be identified in each of the primary categories of hazards/faults e.g. with regard to the threat of a fall of ground due to bord collapse would be fall of ground originating from the hangingwall and fall of ground originating from the sidewall.

### Tertiary faults

The component hazards that can be identified in each of the secondary categories of hazards/faults e.g. with regard to fall of ground from the hangingwall would be fall of ground from the hangingwall in the face area, fall of ground from the hangingwall in the back area, or fall of ground from the hangingwall at intersections.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

The failure of any system, e.g. a fall of ground in an underground excavation, is seldom the result of a single **cause** or **fault**. Failure usually results after a combination of faults occur in such a way that the factor of safety of the system falls to below unity. A disciplined and systematic approach is therefore required to determine the correct logic that controls the failure of the system and to analyse the potential consequences of failure. One such approach, the **Fault-Event Tree Analysis**, is discussed here.

## 2 CAUSE/FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

**Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)** is a quantitative or qualitative technique by which conditions and factors that can contribute to a specified undesired incident (called the **top fault**) are deductively identified, organised in a logical manner, and presented pictorially. It can also be defined as a deductive failure analysis which focuses on one particular undesired fault and which provides a method for determining causes of the fault.

FTA affords a disciplined approach that is highly systematic, but at the same time sufficiently flexible to allow analysis of a variety of factors. The application of the top-down approach focuses attention on those effects of failure that are directly related to the top fault. FTA is especially useful for analysing systems with many interfaces and interactions. The pictorially representation leads to an easy understanding of the system behaviour and the factors included, but as trees are often large, processing of fault trees may require computer systems.

Starting with the top fault, the possible causes or failure modes (**primary faults**) on the next lower system level are identified. Following the step-by-step identification or undesirable system operation to successively lower levels, **secondary faults**, **tertiary faults**, etc. are identified.

In order to determine the correct logic that controls the failure of the system, the faults are not initially given probabilities of occurrence. In this form the “tree” is referred to as a “**cause tree**”. Once the cause tree is considered to correctly reflect the combinations of faults necessary to result in failure, probabilities are either calculated or assigned to the faults. In this form, the “tree” is referred to as a “**fault tree**”.

Thus, a fault tree represents a quantitative or qualitative evaluation of the probabilities of various faults leading to the calculation of the **top faults**, which result in failure of the system. The objective of the fault tree is to identify and model the various system conditions that can result in the top fault (e.g. threat of FOG in East Block due to bord collapse).

### 3 **PROBABILITY EVALUATION IN FAULT TREE**

The fault tree is a complex of entities known as **gates** which serve to permit or inhibit the passage of fault logic up the tree. The gates show the relationships of faults needed for the occurrence of a higher fault. **AND** gates and **OR** gates denote the type of relationship of the input events required for the output event.

- AND gates are used where faults are statistically dependent. If it is necessary for  $n$  secondary faults to occur in order for a primary fault to result, then the probability of occurrence,  $p$ , is represented by:

$$p[\textit{primary fault}] = p[\textit{secondary fault 1}] \times p[\textit{secondary fault 2}] \times \dots \times p[\textit{secondary fault n}]$$

- OR gates are used where faults are statistically independent. If a primary fault can result as a consequence of the occurrence of any  $n$  secondary faults, then the probability of occurrence is determined from the calculation as follows:

$$p[\textit{primary fault}] = 1 - (1 - p[\textit{secondary fault 1}]) \times (1 - p[\textit{secondary fault 2}]) \dots (1 - p[\textit{secondary fault n}])$$



#### 4 **EVENT TREE ANALYSIS**

The potential damaging consequences of a top fault is known as **events** and the systematic display of the events is referred to as an **event tree**. The probability of occurrence of a top fault together with relative weighting for the associated potentially adverse events, enable their likely occurrence to be determined. The product of the probability of occurrence and severity of the damage of an event is defined as the **risk**.

The systematic nature of the fault event tree enables the sensitivities of the potentially adverse consequences to any of the causative hazards to be evaluated. This enables the most threatening causative hazards to be identified and eliminatory measures to be defined.

#### 5 **ALLOCATION OF PROBABILITIES OF OCCURRENCE**

Three measures are available for measuring reliability in engineering design, viz:

- the factor of safety;
- the reliability index, and;
- the probability of failure.

The factor of safety is a clearly understood and a numerically sensitive measure. It is, however, not a consistent measure and is not determined in terms of consistent processes. The reliability index is a consistent measure and is based on consistent processes for determining operational values. Its meaning is, however, not clearly understood. It is also not numerically sensitive, especially not with regard to higher orders of reliability.

The probability of failure is a consistent and numerically sensitive measure and is based on consistent processes for the determination of operational values. The numerical sensitivity of the probability of failure, however, detracts from the clarity of its meaning. The probabilities of various kinds of losses of life, property, etc. vary exponentially over many orders of magnitude between very large and very small values. The meaning of such a measure is often difficult to understand.

The difficulties that designers have in selecting acceptable thresholds for probability of failure can be resolved by using the norms and guidelines for selecting acceptable probabilities of failure for design, presented in a paper entitled: “Review of norms for probability of failure and risk in engineering design”, (Kirsten, 1994). Acceptable probabilities of failure are discussed further in Section 6.

The acceptable lifetime probabilities of total loss of life described in this paper by Kirsten are summarised in Table 1 below. Also included in the table are the corresponding probabilities assigned to hazards associated with the installation of rockbolts.

**Table 2 Acceptable lifetime probabilities of total loss of life and corresponding probabilities assigned to hazards.**

<b>Degree of risk / Probability of occurrence</b>	<b>Acceptable lifetime probabilities</b> (after Cole, 1993)
<b>Very Risky / Certain (C)</b>	$7 \times 10^0$
<b>Risky / Very high (VH)</b>	$7 \times 10^{-01}$
<b>Some risk / High (H)</b>	$7 \times 10^{-02}$
<b>Slight chance / Medium (M)</b>	$7 \times 10^{-03}$
<b>Unlikely / Low (L)</b>	$7 \times 10^{-04}$
<b>Very unlikely / Very low (VL)</b>	$7 \times 10^{-05}$
<b>Practically impossible / Extremely low (EL)</b>	$7 \times 10^{-06}$
<b>Practically zero (PZ)</b>	$7 \times 10^{-07}$

In certain cases, probabilities of occurrence could also be determined more accurately by assigning probability density functions to primary faults. This is particularly important in geotechnical engineering designs where input parameters, especially those that are effected by geology, are often not known accurately and the influence of their variability should be accounted for. However, probabilistic analyses of multiple variables require sophisticated numerical techniques that are beyond the scope of this project.

A simplified approach is to assign probabilities based on engineering judgement and past experience with this type of work. Probabilities assigned to certain levels of risk as described in Table 1 could be used as a guideline. The final result will then show if a more accurate assessment of the probability of occurrence would be necessary. It is likely that the detailed assessment will only be required for key sensitive areas which will be revealed by sensitivity analysis.

It is important to note that probabilities of occurrence may not have unique or discrete values. It is possible for a probability of a particular fault (or event) to change in sympathy with another probability that it is coupled with. This is best illustrated by means of an example:

*Take the example of a “wrong support installation procedure” being used in an underground excavation. The probability of a wrong support installation procedure being used depends upon the probability that:*

- *the knowledge about the correct support installation procedure is lacking, or;*
- *the equipment being used for support installations is out of order, or;*
- *the discipline and supervision are poor.*

*The probability that the knowledge about the correct support installation procedure is lacking in turn depends on the probability that:*


- *the support installation procedure is not defined by the mine’s standards, or;*
- *the support installation procedure is not communicated to the workers, or;*
- *the workers are incompetent.*

*The probability that the workers are incompetent depends on the probability that:*

- *inadequate training is provided, or;*
- *the workers are untrainable.*

*The probability of a wrong support installation procedure being used could be different for different parts or sections of the mine. For example, the equipment being used for support installation in one section could be more reliable than the equipment being used in another section.*

The probability of a wrong support installation procedure being used can be represented as follows:



## 6 ACCEPTABLE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE

The use of probability of failure is a means of incorporating acceptable and tolerable levels of risk into engineering designs. As mentioned before, risk is the product of the probability of failure and the consequence of an unwanted event, in this case, falls of ground.

The acceptability of probabilities of failure for particular design applications can be evaluated in terms of the magnitudes and distributions of actual frequencies of total losses of life, property and money. For example, the lifetime frequencies of fatalities due to unstable ground in gold and coal mines in South Africa in 1993 amounted to approximately 7,9% and 2,8% respectively (Kirsten, 1994). (These correspond with fatality rates/1000 at work of 0,76 and 0,37 respectively.)

According to Cole (1993), an acceptable lifetime probability of loss of life in respect of voluntary employment in underground mines would be 0,7%. This would bring about a 10 fold reduction in

the number of fatalities in metalliferous mines and a 4 fold reduction in the number of fatalities in coal mines.

The lifetime frequency of a detrimental event represents the probable unit number of times to which any person would be exposed to it during his/her whole life. It is directly related to the fatality accident rate, FAR, defined by Hambly and Hambly (1994) as the risk of death per 100 million hours of exposure to a dangerous activity. This is approximately the same as the probable number of fatalities from 1000 people involved in the activity for the whole of their working lives, each about 100 000 hours (50 years x 250 days/year x 8 hours/day). Expressed as a percentage, the lifetime probability of occurrence of an event is therefore equal to  $FAR \times 100/1000 = 0,1 \times FAR$ . This measure enables losses from different occupations to be compared on a common basis. It also enables exposures to losses for part of a day to be compared to full time exposures.

When the consequences of failure are serious, a reduced probability of failure needs to be adopted in order to achieve an acceptable level of risk, e.g., when mining a panel of pillars, the normal acceptable level of risk in terms of probability of failure is 3 in 1000 (Galvin et al, 1998). However, this probability of failure would be unacceptable for a more serious consequence of failure, such as flooding of the workings. In this case, a probability of failure of at least 1 in 100 000 may be chosen as representative of the tolerable level of risk, considering the seriousness of the consequences.

Other recommendations for acceptable probabilities of failure found in the literature can be summarised as follows:

- According to Galvin et al (1998), a probability of coal pillar failure of 3 in 1000 relates to a FOS of 1,59, and a probability of failure of 1 in 100 relates to a FOS of 1,48. This correlation is based on data from the Australian coalfields.
- According to the back-analysis carried out by Salamon and Wagner (1984), the rate of coal pillar failure in South Africa had been 0,003, which compared with the predicted probability of pillar failure of 0,003 for a FOS of 1,6.
- D'Andrea and Sangrey (1982) have shown that probabilities of slope failure of 0,1; 0,01 and 0,001 correspond with factors of safety ranging from 1,25 to 1,93; 1,43 to 3,13 and 1,58 to 4,49 respectively.
- According to Cole (1993), an acceptable life-time probability of loss of life in respect of voluntary employment in underground mines would be 0,7% or 0,007.

Kirsten (1994) suggests that acceptable levels for probabilities of failure for which designs may be prepared should be significantly smaller than the actual probabilities of failure observed for similar situations. This is required to account for the following aspects.

1) Natural aversion to involuntary total loss

Slovic (1987) found that the acceptability of risk is related to the benefits of the activity and the voluntary or involuntary nature thereof. Public aversion to risk is also related to the number of people involved. The design engineer should take note of these aspects when selecting a value for the probability of failure for a particular case.

2) Variations in perceptions

Slovic (1987) found that risk means different things to different people, depending on their background. Selecting a value for probability of failure should take cognisance of the variations in the perceptions of risk, but need not cater unduly for misconceptions on the part of the public.

3) Non-representativeness of actual comparative probabilities of failure

The design engineer should take note of the scatter of various acceptable probabilities of failure.

4) Variations in parameter values and biases in calculation procedures

Design engineers should be aware of the effects of variations in parameter values on the reliability of the probability of failure that may be determined.

5) Deficiencies in design data

Ground conditions are known to carry potentially high risks and uncertainty. According to Sowers (1993) a study of 500 geotechnical failures revealed that 88% of the failures were produced by human shortcomings and that 75% of the failures originated in the design process. Whyte and Tonks (1993) submit that these problems are directly and largely attributable to deficiencies in the site investigations undertaken for design purposes.

Acceptable probabilities of failure cannot be prescribed. Each mine should therefore decide on a value for probability of rockfall accidents that would be acceptable to the mine. In the mean time, SRK suggests that a value of 0,003 or 0,3% be used as an acceptable probability of a rock fall incident occurring. The lifetime probability of total loss of life should therefore be a few orders of magnitude smaller than the acceptable levels suggested by Cole (1993). This corresponds with Kirsten's (1994) suggestion that acceptable levels for probabilities of failure for which designs may be prepared should be significantly smaller than the actual probabilities of failure observed for similar situations.

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## **Appendix B**

### **Detailed Risk Assessment**



## **1. Procurement Procedure**

## Risk Assessment

EVENT TREE ANALYSIS	
Average time of exposure (%)Revision 2013	12.5%
Exposure results in fatal accidents (%)	0.1
Exposure results in injuries only (%)	99.9
<b>Risk of fatal accident (number of fatal accidents)</b>	<b>4.13E-08</b>
<b>Risk of injury (number of people injured)</b>	<b>4.13E-05</b>

Client Name:	M Props (Pty) Ltd
Date of risk assessment:	Rev 2013
Product:	Heavy Duty Camlok Prop

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS		Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>		<b>3.31E-04</b>	
1	<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props due to poor procurement procedures</b>	3.31E-04	
1.1	<b>Incorrect Camlok Prop supplied to the mine OR</b>	2.21E-04	
1.1.1	<b>Incorrect order received by Camlok OR</b>	2.02E-05	
1.1.1.1	Incorrect stock code used <b>OR</b>	1.01E-05	
1.1.1.1.1	Camlok unit not loaded on purchasing system <b>OR</b>	1.00E-07	PZ
1.1.1.1.2	No stock available	1.00E-05	VL
1.1.1.2	Incorrect unit description used <b>OR</b>	1.01E-05	
1.1.1.2.1	Camlok unit not loaded on purchasing system <b>OR</b>	1.00E-07	PZ
1.1.1.2.2	No stock available	1.00E-05	VL
1.1.2	<b>Incorrect specification received by purchasing department</b>	2.00E-04	
1.1.2.1	Incorrect stock code used when ordering by mining personnel <b>OR</b>	1.00E-04	
1.1.2.1.1	Camlok unit not loaded on purchasing system <b>OR</b>	1.00E-07	PZ
1.1.2.1.2	No stock available <b>OR</b>	1.00E-07	PZ
1.1.2.1.3	Incorrect type of Camlok ordered <b>OR</b>	1.00E-04	L
1.1.2.1.4	Incorrect unit length ordered for stoping width	1.00E-04	L
1.1.2.2	Incorrect unit description used when ordering by mining personnel <b>OR</b>	1.00E-04	
1.1.2.2.1	Camlok unit not loaded on purchasing system <b>OR</b>	1.00E-07	PZ
1.1.2.2.2	No stock available <b>OR</b>	1.00E-07	PZ
1.1.2.2.3	Incorrect type of Camlok ordered <b>OR</b>	1.00E-07	PZ
1.1.2.2.4	Incorrect unit length ordered for mine excavation	1.00E-04	L
1.2	<b>Incorrect support design</b>	1.10E-04	
1.2.1	<b>Inappropriate type of Camlok Prop recommended</b>	1.10E-04	
1.2.1.1	Incorrect unit description	1.10E-04	
1.2.1.1.1	Lack of knowledge of loading conditions <b>OR</b>	1.00E-04	L
1.2.1.1.2	No stock available	1.00E-05	VL

## **2. Receiving by Mine**

## Risk Assessment

EVENT TREE ANALYSIS	
Average time of exposure (%)	25.0%
Exposure results in fatal accidents (%)	0.1
Exposure results in injuries only (%)	99.9
<b>Risk of fatal accident (number of fatal accidents)</b>	<b>1.77E-07</b>
<b>Risk of injury (number of people injured)</b>	<b>1.77E-04</b>

Client Name:	M Props (Pty) Ltd
Date of risk assessment:	Revision 2013
Product:	Heavy Duty Camlok Prop

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS		Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>		<b>7.07E-04</b>	
2	<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props due to poor receiving practice by the mine</b>	7.07E-04	
2.1	<b>Poor Packing OR</b>	1.06E-04	
2.1.1	<b>Falling material</b>	1.04E-04	
2.1.1.1	Material falling off the truck during transportation OR	2.10E-06	
2.1.1.1.1	Failure of strapping OR	1.00E-06	EL
2.1.1.1.2	Pallet shifting OR	1.00E-06	EL
2.1.1.1.3	Gate of the truck opening	1.00E-07	PZ
2.1.1.2	Material falling striking a person while off loading	1.02E-04	
2.1.1.2.1	Pallet shifting OR	1.00E-06	EL
2.1.1.2.2	Poor long material handling OR	1.00E-04	L
2.1.1.2.3	Failure of strapping	1.00E-06	EL
2.1.2	<b>Shifted material</b>	2.20E-06	
2.1.2.1	Material falling due to lack of handling space OR	2.00E-06	
2.1.2.1.1	Failure of strapping OR	1.00E-06	EL
2.1.2.1.2	Loose material	1.00E-06	EL
2.1.2.2	Unable to off load due to lack of access	2.00E-07	
2.1.2.2.1	Failure of strapping OR	1.00E-07	PZ
2.1.2.2.2	Loose material	1.00E-07	PZ
2.2	<b>Lack of off-loading equipment OR</b>	5.00E-04	
2.2.1	<b>Poor handling practice</b>	5.00E-04	
2.2.1.1	Injury due to manual labour OR	2.00E-04	
2.2.1.1.1	Falling Material OR	1.00E-04	L
2.2.1.1.2	Body Strain	1.00E-04	L
2.2.1.2	Falling material due to lack of handling capabilities	3.00E-04	
2.2.1.2.1	Insufficient labour to off load material OR	1.00E-04	L
2.2.1.2.2	Poor long material handling OR	1.00E-04	L
2.2.1.2.3	Damage to props while off loading	1.00E-04	L
2.3	<b>Late delivery</b>	1.01E-04	
2.3.1	<b>Rushing of off loading</b>	1.01E-04	
2.3.1.1	Falling material	1.01E-04	
2.3.1.1.1	Insufficient labour to off load material due late delivery OR	1.00E-06	EL
2.3.1.1.2	Poor long material handling	1.00E-04	L

### **3. Surface Storage**

## Risk Assessment

EVENT TREE ANALYSIS	
Average time of exposure (%)	12.5%
Exposure results in fatal accidents (%)	0.1
Exposure results in injuries only (%)	99.9
<b>Risk of fatal accident (number of fatal accidents)</b>	<b>2.60E-08</b>
<b>Risk of injury (number of people injured)</b>	<b>2.60E-05</b>

Client Name:	M Props (Pty) Ltd
Date of risk assessment:	Revision 2013
Product:	Heavy Duty Camlok Prop

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS			Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>			<b>2.08E-04</b>	
3	<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props due to poor storage on surface.</b>		2.08E-04	
3.1	<b>Poor packing OR</b>		1.90E-06	
3.1.1	<b>Falling props OR</b>		1.50E-06	
3.1.1.1	Material falling during storage OR		1.20E-06	
3.1.1.1.1	Failure of strapping OR		1.00E-07	PZ
3.1.1.1.2	Pallet failure OR		1.00E-06	EL
3.1.1.1.3	Stack falling over		1.00E-07	PZ
3.1.1.2	Material falling striking a person during storage		3.00E-07	
3.1.1.2.1	Pallet shifting OR		1.00E-07	PZ
3.1.1.2.2	Poor long material handling OR		1.00E-07	PZ
3.1.1.2.3	Failure of strapping		1.00E-07	PZ
3.1.2	<b>Shifted material</b>		4.00E-07	
3.1.2.1	Material falling due to lack of handling space OR		2.00E-07	
3.1.2.1.1	Failure of strapping OR		1.00E-07	PZ
3.1.2.1.2	Loose material		1.00E-07	PZ
3.1.2.2	Unable to transport due to lack of access		2.00E-07	
3.1.2.2.1	Failure of strapping OR		1.00E-07	PZ
3.1.2.2.2	Loose material		1.00E-07	PZ
3.2	<b>Weathering of props OR</b>		1.03E-04	
3.2.1	<b>Poor storage practice</b>		1.03E-04	
3.2.1.1	Sun damage to props OR		1.00E-06	
3.2.1.1.1	Identification stickers peel off		1.00E-06	EL
3.2.1.2	Sun damage to release sling OR		1.00E-04	
3.2.1.2.1	Breaking of sling underground		1.00E-04	L
3.2.1.3	Storage in mud or water		2.00E-06	
3.2.1.3.1	Prop is defective due to mud accumulation OR		1.00E-06	EL
3.2.1.3.2	Prop is defective due to corrosion		1.00E-06	EL
3.3	<b>Unbundling of props OR</b>		1.01E-04	
3.3.1	<b>Falling props</b>		1.01E-04	
3.3.1.1	Falling material		1.01E-04	
3.3.1.1.1	Insufficient labour OR		1.00E-06	EL
3.3.1.1.2	Poor long material handling OR		1.00E-06	EL
3.3.1.1.3	Hand injuries		1.00E-04	L
3.4	<b>Poor inventory control</b>		2.00E-06	
3.4.1	<b>Inadequate stock</b>		2.00E-06	
3.4.1.1	Failure to supply section		2.00E-06	
3.4.1.1.1	Lost Blast OR		1.00E-06	EL
3.4.1.1.2	Workplace not supported to mine standard		1.00E-06	EL

## **4. Despatching to the Shaft**

EVENT TREE ANALYSIS	
Average time of exposure (%)	25.0%
Exposure results in fatal accidents (%)	0.1
Exposure results in injuries only (%)	99.9
<b>Risk of fatal accident (number of fatal accidents)</b>	<b>1.76E-07</b>
<b>Risk of injury (number of people injured)</b>	<b>1.76E-04</b>

## Risk Assessment

Client Name:	M Props (Pty) Ltd
Date of risk assessment:	Revision 2013
Product:	Heavy Duty Camlok Prop

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS			Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>			<b>7.06E-04</b>	
4	<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props due to poor dispatching procedures by the mine</b>		7.06E-04	
4.1	<b>Poor Packing OR</b>		1.06E-04	
4.1.1	<b>Falling material OR</b>		1.04E-04	
4.1.1.1	Material falling off the material car during transportation OR		2.00E-06	
4.1.1.1.1	Failure of strapping OR		1.00E-06	EL
4.1.1.1.2	Pallet shifting OR		1.00E-06	EL
4.1.1.2	Material falling striking a person while off loading		1.02E-04	
4.1.1.2.1	Pallet shifting OR		1.00E-06	EL
4.1.1.2.2	Poor long material handling OR		1.00E-04	L
4.1.1.2.3	Failure of strapping		1.00E-06	EL
4.1.2	<b>Shifted material</b>		2.20E-06	
4.1.2.1	Material falling due to lack of handling space OR		2.00E-06	
4.1.2.1.1	Failure of strapping OR		1.00E-06	EL
4.1.2.1.2	Loose material		1.00E-06	EL
4.1.2.2	Unable to off load due to lack of access		2.00E-07	
4.1.2.2.1	Failure of strapping OR		1.00E-07	PZ
4.1.2.2.2	Loose material		1.00E-07	PZ
4.2	<b>Lack of off-loading equipment OR</b>		5.00E-04	
4.2.1	<b>Poor handling practice</b>		5.00E-04	
4.2.1.1	Injury due to manual labour OR		2.00E-04	
4.2.1.1.1	Falling Material OR		1.00E-04	L
4.2.1.1.2	Body Strain		1.00E-04	L
4.2.1.2	Falling material due to lack of handling capabilities		3.00E-04	
4.2.1.2.1	Insufficient labour to off-load material OR		1.00E-04	L
4.2.1.2.2	Poor long material handling		1.00E-04	L
4.2.1.2.3	Damage to props while off-loading		1.00E-04	L
4.3	<b>Late delivery</b>		1.01E-04	
4.3.1	<b>Rushing of off-loading</b>		1.01E-04	
4.3.1.1	Falling material		1.01E-04	
4.3.1.1.1	Insufficient labour to off-load material due late delivery OR		1.00E-06	EL
4.3.1.1.2	Poor long material handling		1.00E-04	L



## **5. Shaft Transport**

EVENT TREE ANALYSIS	
Average time of exposure (%)	6.3%
Exposure results in fatal accidents (%)	0.1
Exposure results in injuries only (%)	99.9
<b>Risk of fatal accident (number of fatal accidents)</b>	<b>1.29E-07</b>
<b>Risk of injury (number of people injured)</b>	<b>1.29E-04</b>

## Risk Assessment

Client Name:	M Props (Pty) Ltd
Date of risk assessment:	Revision 2013
Product:	Heavy Duty Camlok Prop

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS		Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>		<b>2.07E-03</b>	
5	<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props due to poor shaft transport procedures by the mine</b>	2.07E-03	
5.1	<b>Poor packing of material cars OR</b>	2.05E-03	
5.1.1	<b>Falling material</b>	2.05E-03	
5.1.1.1	Props falling out of material cars during transportation OR	1.03E-03	
5.1.1.1.1	Poor packing of material cars OR	1.00E-05	VL
5.1.1.1.2	Material cars too short OR	1.00E-05	VL
5.1.1.1.3	Poor long material handling OR	1.00E-03	M
5.1.1.1.4	Over loading	1.00E-05	VL
5.1.1.2	Material falling striking a person while off-loading	1.02E-03	
5.1.1.2.1	Poor packing of material cars OR	1.00E-05	VL
5.1.1.2.2	Poor long material handling OR	1.00E-03	M
5.1.1.2.3	Over loading	1.00E-05	VL
5.2	<b>Poor handling of long props OR</b>	2.00E-06	
5.2.1	<b>Poor handling practice</b>	2.00E-06	
5.2.1.1	Poor Slings OR	2.00E-06	
5.2.1.1.1	Falling Material OR	1.00E-06	EL
5.2.1.1.2	Falling bogie	1.00E-06	EL
5.3	<b>Lack of shaft availability</b>	2.00E-05	
5.3.1	<b>Props not transported when required</b>	2.00E-05	
5.3.1.1	Failure to supply the section	2.00E-05	
5.3.1.1.1	Lost blast OR	1.00E-05	VL
5.3.1.1.2	Workplace not supported to mine standard	1.00E-05	VL

## **6. Horizontal Transport**

EVENT TREE ANALYSIS	
Average time of exposure (%)	25.0%
Exposure results in fatal accidents (%)	0.1
Exposure results in injuries only (%)	99.9
<b>Risk of fatal accident (number of fatal accidents)</b>	<b>1.06E-06</b>
<b>Risk of injury (number of people injured)</b>	<b>1.06E-03</b>

## Risk Assessment

Client Name:	M Props (Pty) Ltd
Date of risk assessment:	Revision 2013
Product:	Heavy Duty Camlok Prop

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS			Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>			<b>4.24E-03</b>	
6	Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props due to poor horizontal transport procedures by the mine		4.24E-03	
6.1	Poor packing of material cars OR		2.05E-03	
6.1.1	Falling material		2.05E-03	
6.1.1.1	Props falling out of material cars during transportation OR		1.03E-03	
6.1.1.1.1	Poor packing of material cars OR		1.00E-05	VL
6.1.1.1.2	Material cars too short OR		1.00E-05	VL
6.1.1.1.3	Poor long material handling OR		1.00E-03	M
6.1.1.1.4	Over loading		1.00E-05	VL
6.1.1.2	Material falling striking a person while off-loading		1.02E-03	
6.1.1.2.1	Poor packing of material cars OR		1.00E-05	VL
6.1.1.2.2	Poor long material handling OR		1.00E-03	M
6.1.1.2.3	Over loading		1.00E-05	VL
6.2	Poor handling of long props OR		2.00E-03	
6.2.1	Poor handling practice		2.00E-03	
6.2.1.1	Poor packing OR		2.00E-03	
6.2.1.1.1	Falling Material OR		1.00E-03	M
6.2.1.1.2	Loose material		1.00E-03	M
6.3	Lack of transport availability		2.00E-04	
6.3.1	Props not transported when required		2.00E-04	
6.3.1.1	Failure to supply the section		2.00E-04	
6.3.1.1.1	Lost blast OR		1.00E-04	L
6.3.1.1.2	Workplace not supported to mine standard		1.00E-04	L

## **7. Transport to the Workplace**

### EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

Average time of exposure (%)	12.5%
Exposure results in fatal accidents (%)	1
Exposure results in injuries only (%)	99
<b>Risk of fatal accident (number of fatal accidents)</b>	<b>2.17E-05</b>
<b>Risk of injury (number of people injured)</b>	<b>2.15E-03</b>

### Risk Assessment

Client Name:	M Props (Pty) Ltd
Date of risk assessment:	Revision 2013
Product:	Heavy Duty Camlok Prop

### FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

		Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>		<b>1.73E-02</b>	
7	Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props due to poor transportation to the workplace	1.73E-02	
7.1	Transportation to working place	1.73E-02	
7.1.1	Poor storage in timber bay OR	4.40E-03	
7.1.1.1	Falling material	2.20E-03	
7.1.1.1.1	Poor stacking OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.1.1.2	Poor off loading OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.1.1.3	Poor long material handling OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.1.1.4	Lack of storage space	1.00E-03	M
7.1.1.2	Trip and fall	2.20E-03	
7.1.1.2.1	Poor packing of material OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.1.2.2	Poor long material storage OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.1.2.3	Loose material OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.1.2.4	Restricted travelling space	1.00E-03	M
7.1.1.3	Material Corrosion	2.00E-06	
7.1.1.3.1	Prop is defective due to mud accumulation OR	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.1.3.2	Prop is defective due to corrosion	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.1.4	Damage of prop while being stored	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.2	Transport to slope OR	8.14E-03	
7.1.2.1	Transportation by mono winch OR	1.14E-03	
7.1.2.1.1	Poor attachment of prop to mono winch rope OR	1.00E-05	VL
7.1.2.1.2	Hand injuries while handling and attaching prop mono winch rope OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.2.1.3	Props striking a worker while in transit OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.2.1.4	Damage of loose parts of prop while in transit OR	1.00E-05	VL
7.1.2.1.5	Moving parts of prop causing injury to personnel OR	1.00E-05	VL
7.1.2.1.6	Poor removal of prop at slope due damage	1.00E-05	VL
7.1.2.2	Transportation by manual labour	7.01E-03	
7.1.2.2.1	Slip and fall OR	3.00E-04	
7.1.2.2.1.1	Loose rock on footwall OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.2.2.1.2	Steep dipping slope angle OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.2.2.1.3	Smooth slippery footwall	1.00E-04	L
7.1.2.2.2	Poor carrying method OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.2.2.3	Poor human ability OR	2.20E-03	
7.1.2.2.3.1	Long Distance OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.2.2.3.2	Excessive weight OR	1.20E-03	
7.1.2.2.3.2.1	Back strain OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.2.2.3.2.2	Difficulty with long props OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.2.2.3.2.3	Slip and fall	1.00E-04	L
7.1.2.2.4	Dropping of props OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.2.2.5	Injury caused by moving parts OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.2.2.6	Damage to props while being transported OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.2.2.7	Difficulty of transporting in confined spaces OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.2.2.8	Extreme heat OR	1.10E-05	
7.1.2.2.8.1	Heat stroke OR	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.2.2.8.2	Heat exhaustion	1.00E-05	VL
7.1.2.2.9	Fall of ground caused by disturbance of the hangingwall OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.2.2.10	Injury caused by obstructions OR	2.02E-03	
7.1.2.2.10.1	Protruding roof bolts OR	1.00E-05	VL
7.1.2.2.10.2	Other material being Transported OR	1.00E-05	VL
7.1.2.2.10.3	Other material lying in the path OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.2.2.10.4	Poor footwall conditions	1.00E-03	M
7.1.2.2.11	Insufficient labour	1.00E-04	L

## FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

		Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>		<b>1.73E-02</b>	
7	<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props due to poor transportation to the workplace</b>	1.73E-02	
7.1.3	<b>Transport to development OR</b>	4.90E-03	
7.1.3.1	Inclined development	4.90E-03	
7.1.3.1.1	Slip and fall OR	2.00E-04	
7.1.3.1.1.1	Loose rock on footwall OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.1.1.2	Smooth slippery footwall	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.1.2	Poor carrying method OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.1.3	Poor human ability OR	2.20E-03	
7.1.3.1.3.1	Long Distance OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.3.1.3.2	Excessive weight	1.20E-03	
7.1.3.1.3.2.1	Back strain OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.1.3.2.2	Difficulty with long props OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.1.2.4.2.3	Slip and fall	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.1.4	Dropping of props OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.1.5	Injury caused by moving parts OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.3.1.6	Damage to props while being transported OR	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.3.1.7	Difficulty of transporting in confined spaces OR	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.3.1.8	Extreme heat OR	1.10E-06	
7.1.3.1.8.1	Heat stroke OR	1.00E-07	PZ
7.1.3.1.8.2	Heat exhaustion	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.3.1.9	Fall of ground caused by disturbance of the hangingwall or sidewall OR	1.00E-05	VL
7.1.3.1.10	Injury caused by obstructions	1.20E-03	
7.1.3.1.10.1	Protruding roof bolts OR	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.3.1.10.2	Other material being Transported OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.1.10.3	Other material lying in the path OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.3.1.10.4	Poor footwall conditions OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.1.11	Insufficient Labour	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.2	Horizontal development	2.61E-03	
7.1.3.2.1	Slip and fall OR	1.00E-04	
7.1.3.2.1.1	Loose rock on footwall OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.2.1.2	Smooth slippery footwall	1.00E-07	PZ
7.1.3.2.2	Poor carrying method OR	1.00E-07	PZ
7.1.3.2.3	Poor human ability OR	1.30E-03	
7.1.3.2.3.1	Long Distance OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.2.3.2	Excessive weight OR	1.20E-03	
7.1.3.2.3.2.1	Back strain OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.2.3.2.2	Difficulty with long props OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.3.2.3.2.3	Slip and fall	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.2.4	Dropping of props OR	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.2.5	Injury caused by moving parts OR	1.00E-03	M
7.1.3.2.6	Damage to props while being transported OR	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.3.2.7	Difficulty of transporting in confined spaces OR	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.3.2.8	Extreme heat OR	2.10E-06	
7.1.3.2.8.1	Heat stroke OR	1.00E-07	PZ
7.1.3.2.8.2	Heat exhaustion	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.3.2.9	Fall of ground caused by disturbance of the hangingwall or sidewall OR	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.3.2.10	Injury caused by obstructions	1.03E-04	
7.1.3.2.10.1	Protruding roof bolts OR	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.3.2.10.2	Other material being Transported OR	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.3.2.10.3	Other material lying in the path OR	1.00E-06	EL
7.1.3.2.10.4	Poor footwall conditions	1.00E-04	L
7.1.3.2.11	Insufficient Labour	1.00E-07	PZ

## **8. Installation**



## EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

Average time of exposure (%)	50.00%
Exposure results in fatal accidents (%)	5
Exposure results in injuries only (%)	95
<b>Risk of fatal accident (number of fatal accidents)</b>	<b>6.50E-03</b>
<b>Risk of injury (number of people injured)</b>	<b>1.23E-01</b>

## Risk Assessment

<b>Client Name:</b>	M Props (pty) Ltd
<b>Date of risk assessment:</b>	Revision 2013
<b>Product:</b>	Heavy Duty Camlok Prop

## FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

		Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>		<b>2.60E-01</b>	
<b>8</b>	<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props while installing a prop</b>	<b>2.60E-01</b>	
<b>8.1</b>	<b>Poor making safe OR</b>	<b>3.58E-04</b>	
8.1.1	<b>Fall of ground AND</b>	<b>1.10E-02</b>	
8.1.1.1	Fall of ground due to disturbance of the hangingwall OR	<b>1.10E-02</b>	
8.1.1.1.1	Prop disturbing the hangingwall OR	1.00E-03	M
8.1.1.1.2	Insufficient preload	1.00E-02	H Load indicator
8.1.2	<b>Poor Ground Conditions</b>	<b>3.26E-02</b>	
8.1.2.1	Highly Jointed OR	1.00E-02	H
8.1.2.2	Faulting OR	1.00E-03	M
8.1.2.3	Dykes OR	1.00E-03	M
8.1.2.4	Poor Blasting OR	1.00E-02	H
8.1.2.5	Flat dipping joints / fractures OR	1.00E-02	H
8.1.2.6	Weak rock mass strength	1.00E-03	M
<b>8.2</b>	<b>Poor footwall conditions OR</b>	<b>1.99E-02</b>	
8.2.1	<b>Footwall not cleaned properly</b>	<b>1.99E-02</b>	
8.2.1.1	Slip and fall OR	1.00E-02	H
8.2.1.2	Unstable footing of prop	1.00E-02	H
<b>8.3</b>	<b>Poor permanent support installation OR</b>	<b>1.00E-02</b>	H Permanent support is to mine standard
<b>8.4</b>	<b>Failure to examine prop condition OR</b>	<b>1.99E-02</b>	
8.4.1	Prop fails to perform to specifications OR	1.00E-02	H
8.4.2	Failure to install prop	1.00E-02	H
<b>8.5</b>	<b>Poor positioning of prop OR</b>	<b>1.79E-01</b>	
8.5.1	<b>Spacing not to mine standards OR</b>	<b>2.97E-02</b>	
8.5.1.1	Insufficient props OR	1.00E-02	H
8.5.1.2	Poor knowledge of mine standard OR	1.00E-02	H
8.5.1.3	Incorrect length of prop / excessive stoping width	1.00E-02	H
8.5.2	<b>Slipping and Falling OR</b>	<b>1.99E-02</b>	
8.5.2.1	Loose rock on footwall OR	1.00E-02	H
8.5.2.2	Smooth slippery footwall	1.00E-02	H
8.5.3	<b>Poor Handling of prop OR</b>	<b>1.00E-01</b>	
8.5.3.1	Injured by being struck by the sliding inner tube OR	1.00E-01	VH
8.5.3.2	Injured by being struck by an unlocked handle	1.00E-04	L
8.5.4	<b>Incorrect position of person installing prop OR</b>	<b>1.99E-02</b>	
8.5.4.1	installing a prop from an unsupported area OR	1.00E-02	H
8.5.4.2	Incorrect body position	1.00E-02	H
8.5.4.2.1	Back strain	1.00E-02	H
8.5.5	<b>Incorrect orientation of prop OR</b>	<b>1.01E-02</b>	
8.5.5.1	Unable to remote release OR	1.00E-02	H
8.5.5.2	Headboard not orientated in direction of mining	1.00E-04	L
8.5.6	<b>Lack of PPE OR</b>	<b>2.00E-04</b>	
8.5.6.1	No Gloves OR	1.00E-04	L
8.5.6.2	No eye protection	1.00E-04	L
8.5.7	<b>Steep dipping excavations</b>	<b>1.10E-02</b>	
8.5.7.1	Injury due to falling prop OR	1.00E-03	M
8.5.7.2	Poor installation angle	1.00E-02	H
<b>8.6</b>	<b>Failure to extending inner tube and locating setting pin correctly OR</b>	<b>5.11E-02</b>	
8.6.1	<b>Headboard too close to hangingwall OR</b>	<b>2.19E-02</b>	
8.6.1.1	Insufficient lift of cam OR	1.00E-02	H
8.6.1.2	Slipping of the cam during loading by the rock mass OR	1.00E-02	H
8.6.1.3	Failure to zero the cams OR	1.00E-03	M
8.6.1.4	Incorrect length of prop / excessive stoping width	1.00E-03	M
8.6.2	<b>Setting pin not fully inserted OR</b>	<b>1.00E-02</b>	
8.6.2.1	Poor performance of prop OR	1.00E-02	H
8.6.2.2	Prop may became dislodged OR	1.00E-07	PZ
8.6.2.3	Poor preload placed on prop OR	1.00E-07	PZ
8.6.2.4	Incorrect orientation of setting pin for remote release	1.00E-02	H
8.6.3	<b>Hand injury during collar manipulation and pin insertion OR</b>	<b>1.00E-06</b>	
8.6.3.1	Lack of grip leading to hand and finger injuries AND	1.00E-03	M

## FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

		Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>		<b>2.60E-01</b>	
<b>8</b>	<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props while installing a prop</b>	<b>2.60E-01</b>	
	8.6.3.2 No gloves	1.00E-03	M
8.6.4	<b>High Excavations &gt; 2.5 metres OR</b>	<b>1.99E-02</b>	
	8.6.4.1 injury caused by falling prop OR	1.00E-02	H
	8.6.4.2 Injury due to failure to use inner tube lifter (M6, M6a, M7 and M8) OR	1.00E-02	H
	8.6.4.3 Incorrect headboard orientation	1.00E-02	H
8.6.5	<b>Slipping of inner tube OR</b>	<b>1.00E-04</b>	
	8.6.5.1 injury caused by slipping inner prop AND	1.00E-02	H
	8.6.5.2 No Gloves	1.00E-02	H
8.6.6	<b>Incorrect orientation of headboard</b>	<b>1.00E-04</b>	
	8.6.6.1 Headboard fails to contain face parallel fracturing	1.00E-04	L
<b>8.7</b>	<b>Failure to pre tension the prop correctly</b>	<b>2.05E-02</b>	
8.7.1	<b>Headboard too close to hangingwall OR</b>	<b>1.00E-04</b>	
	8.7.1.1 Insufficient preload AND	1.00E-02	H
	8.7.1.2 Dislodged prop	1.00E-02	H
8.7.2	<b>Headboard too far from hangingwall OR</b>	<b>1.00E-04</b>	
	8.7.2.1 Insufficient preload AND	1.00E-02	H
	8.7.2.2 Dislodged prop	1.00E-02	H
8.7.3	<b>Failure to disengage jacking handle on return OR</b>	<b>1.00E-04</b>	
	8.7.3.1 Unable to install prop	1.00E-04	L
8.7.4	<b>Corrosion of cam mechanism OR</b>	<b>1.00E-04</b>	
	8.7.4.1 Insufficient preload AND	1.00E-02	H
	8.7.4.2 Dislodged prop	1.00E-02	H
8.7.5	<b>Failure to lock jacking handle after preloading OR</b>	<b>1.99E-02</b>	
	8.7.5.1 Trip and fall OR	1.00E-02	H
	8.7.5.2 Dislodged prop	1.00E-02	H
8.7.6	<b>Lack of human ability</b>	<b>2.00E-04</b>	
	8.7.6.1 Back strain OR	1.00E-04	L
	8.7.6.2 Hand injury OR	1.00E-04	L
	8.7.6.3 Insufficient preload	1.00E-02	H

## **9. Installed Prop**

EVENT TREE ANALYSIS	
Average time of exposure (%)	100.00%
Exposure results in fatal accidents (%)	5
Exposure results in injuries only (%)	95
<b>Risk of fatal accident (number of fatal accidents)</b>	<b>5.40E-03</b>
<b>Risk of injury (number of people injured)</b>	<b>1.03E-01</b>

## Risk Assessment

Client Name:	M Props (Pty) Ltd
Date of risk assessment:	Revision 2013
Product:	Heavy Duty Camlok Prop

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS		Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>		<b>1.08E-01</b>	
9	<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props during shift</b>	1.08E-01	
9.1	<b>Unapproved use of prop other than support OR</b>	1.00E-02	
9.1.1	Dislodging of prop	1.00E-02	H
9.2	<b>Fall of Ground OR</b>	4.42E-02	
9.2.1	Dislodging of prop OR	1.20E-02	
9.2.1.1	Lateral loading on prop by fall of ground up dip OR	1.00E-03	M
9.2.1.2	Block rotation and prop sliding out OR	1.00E-02	H
9.2.1.3	Structural failure of prop due to excessive loading	1.00E-03	M
9.2.2	Poor Ground Conditions	3.26E-02	
9.2.2.1	Highly Jointed OR	1.00E-02	H
9.2.2.2	Faulting OR	1.00E-03	M
9.2.2.3	Dykes OR	1.00E-03	M
9.2.2.4	Poor Blasting OR	1.00E-02	H
9.2.2.5	Flat dipping joints / fractures OR	1.00E-02	H
9.2.2.6	Weak rock mass strength	1.00E-03	M
9.3	<b>Inappropriate support design OR</b>	2.98E-02	
9.3.1	Inappropriate prop type for loading conditions	2.98E-02	
9.3.1.1	Incorrect prop performance	2.98E-02	
9.3.1.1.1	Lack of yielding OR	1.00E-02	H
9.3.1.1.2	Insufficient load bearing capability OR	1.00E-04	L
9.3.1.1.3	Insufficient areal coverage capability OR	1.00E-02	H
9.3.1.1.4	Prop dislodged due to lateral loading by safety nets exceeding prop capability	1.00E-02	H
9.4	<b>Illegal prop removal</b>	2.85E-02	
9.4.1	Fall of ground AND	9.90E-01	
9.4.1.1	Increased support spacing OR	1.00E-02	H
9.4.1.2	Reducing of support resistance	1.00E-02	H
9.4.2	Poor Ground Conditions OR	3.26E-02	
9.4.2.1	Highly Jointed OR	1.00E-02	H
9.4.2.2	Faulting OR	1.00E-03	M
9.4.2.3	Dykes OR	1.00E-03	M
9.4.2.4	Poor Blasting OR	1.00E-02	H
9.4.2.5	Flat dipping joints / fractures OR	1.00E-02	H
9.4.2.6	Weak rock mass strength	1.00E-03	M
9.4.3	Obstruction	2.97E-02	
9.4.3.1	Using prop as a strut by driller operator OR	1.99E-02	
9.4.3.1.1	Fall of ground due to vibration OR	1.00E-02	H
9.4.3.1.2	Struck by falling prop	1.00E-02	H
9.4.3.2	Tripping over jack handles	1.00E-02	H

## **10. Prop Removal**

EVENT TREE ANALYSIS	
Average time of exposure (%)	25.00%
Exposure results in fatal accidents (%)	5
Exposure results in injuries only (%)	95
<b>Risk of fatal accident (number of fatal accidents)</b>	<b>6.83E-04</b>
<b>Risk of injury (number of people injured)</b>	<b>1.30E-02</b>

## Risk Assessment

Client Name:	M Props (Pty) Ltd
Date of risk assessment:	Revision 2013
Product:	Heavy Duty Camlok Prop

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS		Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>		<b>5.46E-02</b>	
10	<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props while removing of prop after the shift</b>	5.46E-02	
	<b>10.1 Failure to use remote release sling</b>	4.42E-03	
	10.1.1 <b>Fall of ground AND</b>	1.35E-01	
	10.1.1.1 Incorrect length sling	1.00E-02	H
	10.1.1.2 No Sling available	1.00E-01	VH
	10.1.1.3 Lack of training	1.00E-02	H
	10.1.1.4 Prop orientated incorrectly for remote release	1.00E-02	H
	10.1.1.5 Releasing prop from an unsupported area	1.00E-02	H
	10.1.2 <b>Poor Ground Conditions</b>	3.26E-02	
	10.1.2.1 Highly Jointed OR	1.00E-02	H
	10.1.2.2 Faulting OR	1.00E-03	M
	10.1.2.3 Dykes OR	1.00E-03	M
	10.1.2.4 Poor Blasting OR	1.00E-02	H
	10.1.2.5 Flat dipping joints / fractures OR	1.00E-02	H
	10.1.2.6 Weak rock mass strength	1.00E-03	M
	<b>10.2 Failure to check condition of remote release sling OR</b>	1.21E-02	
	10.2.1 <b>Failure of sling OR</b>	1.21E-02	
	10.2.1.1 Sling breaks OR	1.00E-04	L
	10.2.1.2 Ferrule slips OR	1.00E-02	H
	10.2.1.3 Pig tail damaged OR	1.00E-03	M
	10.2.1.4 Damage caused by general wear and tear	1.00E-03	M
	<b>10.3 Failure of prop to release OR</b>	3.16E-02	
	10.3.1 <b>Excessive excavation closure OR</b>	2.00E-03	
	10.3.1.1 Elastic closure OR	1.00E-03	M Note about stoped panels
	10.3.1.2 Holding dead weight	1.00E-03	M Possible indicator of HW failure
	10.3.2 <b>Prop incorrectly installed OR</b>	2.97E-02	
	10.3.2.1 Prop facing incorrect direction OR	1.00E-02	H
	10.3.2.2 Prop obstructed OR	1.00E-02	H
	10.3.2.3 Insufficient release handle rotation	1.00E-02	H
	<b>10.4 Damage to prop during release OR</b>	1.00E-03	
	10.4.1 <b>Damage to trapping bolt OR</b>	1.00E-03	
	10.4.1.1 Inner tube slides out completely	1.00E-03	M
	10.4.2 <b>Damage to headboard</b>	2.00E-06	
	10.4.2.1 Bending of headboard OR	1.00E-06	EL
	10.4.2.2 Damage or missing rubber	1.00E-06	EL

### FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

		Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>		<b>5.46E-02</b>	
10	<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props while removing of prop after the shift</b>	5.46E-02	
	<b>10.5 Lack of human ability OR</b>	4.39E-03	
	10.5.1 <b>Excess heat conditions OR</b>	1.01E-04	
	10.5.1.1 Heat stroke OR	1.00E-06	EL
	10.5.1.2 Heat exhaustion	1.00E-04	L
	10.5.2 <b>Narrow stoping width OR</b>	1.00E-03	
	10.5.2.1 Insufficient space	1.00E-03	M
	10.5.3 <b>Lack of PPE OR</b>	2.00E-04	
	10.5.3.1 Gloves OR	1.00E-04	L
	10.5.3.2 Eye Protection	1.00E-04	L
	10.5.4 <b>Injury while releasing prop</b>	3.10E-03	
	10.5.4.1 Back strain due to incorrect body position OR	1.00E-04	L
	10.5.4.2 Hand injury due to wrapping sling around hand before releasing prop OR	1.00E-03	M
	10.5.4.3 Injury caused by slip and fall OR	1.00E-03	M
	10.5.4.4 Sling too short for prop length	1.00E-03	M
	<b>10.6 Release of props from a down dip position</b>	2.04E-03	
	10.6.1 <b>Prop wedging OR</b>	1.00E-02	
	10.6.1.1 Failure to use pin extractor	1.00E-02	H
	10.6.2 <b>Fall of ground AND</b>	3.94E-02	
	10.6.2.1 Incorrect length sling OR	1.00E-02	H
	10.6.2.2 No sling available OR	1.00E-02	H
	10.6.2.3 Lack of training OR	1.00E-02	H
	10.6.2.4 Prop orientated incorrectly for remote release	1.00E-02	H
	10.6.3 <b>Poor Ground Conditions OR</b>	3.26E-02	
	10.6.3.1 Highly Jointed OR	1.00E-02	H
	10.6.3.2 Faulting OR	1.00E-03	M
	10.6.3.3 Dykes OR	1.00E-03	M
	10.6.3.4 Poor Blasting OR	1.00E-02	H
	10.6.3.5 Flat dipping joints / fractures OR	1.00E-02	H
	10.6.3.6 Weak rock mass strength	1.00E-03	M
	10.6.4 <b>Struck by falling prop</b>	1.00E-02	
	10.6.4.1 Sling too short for prop length	1.00E-02	H

## **11. Underground Storage**



EVENT TREE ANALYSIS	
Average time of exposure (%)	12.50%
Exposure results in fatal accidents (%)	0.1
Exposure results in injuries only (%)	99.9
<b>Risk of fatal accident (number of fatal accidents)</b>	<b>1.02E-06</b>
<b>Risk of injury (number of people injured)</b>	<b>1.02E-03</b>

## Risk Assessment

Client Name:	M Props (Pty) Ltd
Date of risk assessment:	Revision 2013
Product:	Heavy Duty Camlok Prop

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS		
	Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>	<b>8.17E-03</b>	
11 Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props due to poor underground storage of props	8.17E-03	
11.1 Damage to props and accessories	8.17E-03	
11.1.1 Failure of props and accessories	8.17E-03	
11.1.1.1 Blast Damage to props OR	1.00E-03	M
11.1.1.2 Corrosion of props OR	2.00E-03	
11.1.1.2.1 Prop is defective due to mud accumulation OR	1.00E-03	M
11.1.1.2.2 Prop is defective due to corrosion	1.00E-03	M
11.1.1.3 Poor storage OR	1.20E-03	
11.1.1.3.1 Injury due to falling props OR	1.00E-04	L
11.1.1.3.2 Trip and fall OR	1.00E-03	M
11.1.1.3.3 Poor handling of long props	1.00E-04	L
11.1.1.4 Damage by Scraper OR	1.00E-03	
11.1.1.4.1 Prop Damaged	1.00E-03	M
11.1.1.5 Poor Sling Storage OR	1.00E-03	
11.1.1.5.1 Sling Failure	1.00E-03	M
11.1.1.6 Loss of material	2.00E-03	
11.1.1.6.1 Inability to support to mine standard OR	1.00E-03	M
11.1.1.6.2 Lost blast	1.00E-03	M

## **12. Daily Underground Prop Assessment**

### EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

Average time of exposure (%)	12.50%
Exposure results in fatal accidents (%)	0.1
Exposure results in injuries only (%)	99.9
<b>Risk of fatal accident (number of fatal accidents)</b>	<b>3.21E-06</b>
<b>Risk of injury (number of people injured)</b>	<b>3.21E-03</b>

### Risk Assessment

Client Name:	M Props (Pty) Ltd
Date of risk assessment:	Revision 2013
Product:	Heavy Duty Camlok Prop

### FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

		Probability of occurrence	Comments / Remarks
<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props occurring</b>		<b>2.57E-02</b>	
12	<b>Threat of injury to mine personnel through the use of Heavy Duty Camlok Props due to poor prop performance due to poor daily underground assessment</b>	2.57E-02	
12.1	<b>Poor prop assessment OR</b>	1.49E-02	
12.1.1	<b>Failure to identify</b>	1.49E-02	
12.1.1.1	Damaged headboard OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.2	Damaged / bent inner tube OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.3	Damaged setting holes OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.4	Damaged collar OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.5	Damaged pin and chain OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.6	Damaged outer tube OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.7	Damaged safety chain and chain slot on handle OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.8	Damaged releasing hook OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.9	Damaged / bent handle OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.10	Damaged / bent handle U strap OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.11	Damaged locating lug OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.12	Missing corrosion washer OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.13	Damaged / missing trapping bolt OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.14	Excessive wear / damage to pre-stressing mechanism including gear OR	1.00E-03	M
12.1.1.15	Damaged / missing foot piece	1.00E-03	M
12.2	<b>Poor Sling Assessment OR</b>	5.99E-03	
12.2.1	<b>Failure to identify</b>	5.99E-03	
12.2.1.1	Incorrect sling length OR	1.00E-03	M
12.2.1.2	Damaged plastic cover OR	1.00E-03	M
12.2.1.3	Broken / kinked cable strands OR	1.00E-03	M
12.2.1.4	Damaged / missing handle OR	1.00E-03	M
12.2.1.5	Damaged / missing loop OR	1.00E-03	M
12.2.1.6	Damaged / missing pig tail	1.00E-03	M
12.3	<b>Poor inner tube lifter assessment</b>	4.99E-03	
12.3.1	<b>Failure to identify</b>	4.99E-03	
12.3.1.1	Damaged / bent inner tube lifter OR	1.00E-03	M
12.3.1.2	Corrosion of inner tube lifter OR	1.00E-03	M
12.3.1.3	Dirt on moving parts OR	1.00E-03	M
12.3.1.4	Damaged locating pin OR	1.00E-03	M
12.3.1.5	Missing hinge bolt	1.00E-03	M



**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT**

Tills document was provided to client

\_\_\_\_\_ (Print name)

as a copy of the original risk assessment developed by **SRK Consulting** and I

declare that no changes or alterations have been made to this document.

On behalf of M PROPS

\_\_\_\_\_ (Signature)

This document was delivered to

\_\_\_\_\_ (Print name)

and accepted as a copy of the original document developed by **SRK Consulting** as declared by the supplier.

On behalf of Client

\_\_\_\_\_ (Signature)